Doctors Paid Less Than Fast Food Workers

The Man

Former Staff
Jul 2011
46,487
33,761
Toronto
#1
In Putin's Russia:



Russian doctors are earning less per hour than the country's fast food workers, a new report into the Russian healthcare system has revealed.

Experts from the Center for Economic and Political Reforms (CEPR) found that doctors earned 140 ($2.46) rubles per hour, compared to the hourly wage of 146 rubles ($2.57) for a supervisor at global fast food chain McDonald's.

Paramedics were found to earn an average of 82 ($1.44) rubles an hour, while mid-level health staff received just 72 rubles ($1.27), the RBC news site reported.

The report also found that the number of Russian hospitals will soon fall to levels not seen since 1913.

The number of hospitals in Russia almost halved between the years 2000 and 2015, plummeting from 10,700 across the country to just 5,400.

Under current healthcare reforms, that number will fall to roughly 3,000 by 2021-2022, the same number as seen in the dying days of the Russian Empire.

The report warned that rural areas would be hit hardest, with the number of hospital beds available away from the country's major cities falling as much as 40 percent in fifteen years.

Given Russia's large and sparsely populated territory, you can't fix spending to the number of patients [in a region],” the report said. “This leads to under-funding and "the inevitable degradation of medicine in small towns and villages."

David Meelik-Huseynov, director of the Health Institute at Moscow's Department of Healthcare, defended the reforms as a necessary measure to boost efficiency.

He argued that the while the number of hospitals and beds was decreasing, patient care was continuing to improve.

“Although there are fewer places, they are used more efficiently,” Meelik-Huseynov told the RBC news outlet. “Each hospital bed should be in use 85 to 90 percent of the time. If not, it should be disposed of.”
Russian Doctors Paid Less Than Fast Food Workers

There are big problems with the health system in Russia. Fucking huge.

Low pay, because of chronic under-funding, as mentioned.

Which, actually, creates safety issues, among other things, because hospitals are unable to hire proper security personnel, to deal with violent and dangerous patients.

Here, for example, in February, in a hospital in Novgorod, a drunk and belligerent man attacks nurses who, as I understand, prevented him from seeing his wife (who, I will add, is likely there, at the hospital, recovering from injuries the scumbag probably inflicted on her at home...)
[video=youtube;22J-iotrNJw]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22J-iotrNJw[/video]
Both women suffered injuries, including concussions and in the case of one - facial bone fractures. The hospital's watchman, an old pensioner, didn't get involved. As he himself later admitted, he was afraid of the man. I understand, at his frail age.

That's just one violent incident at a Russian hospital, among plenty this year alone...

Here is an X-ray technician, who was beaten the crap out of last year by an enraged man who was upset that he was taking too much time to take care of his sister


The woman is the sister. She was begging her brother to stop, before he kills the poor guy...

He went to prison later, of course, which I gather is far from his first time there. But, the fact is, there was nobody there, at that hospital, in the suburbs of Moscow, to stop this. A young medic nearly fucking died, because there was no security available to protect him...

And paramedics, most of whom, above pic notwithstanding, are female



also face danger on the job. Also in February, in the city of Saratov, five men locked a young paramedic in their apartment and tried to rape her. Fortunately, she was able to run from them into the bathroom, lock herself in, and call police for help. They were all arrested.

One of the men, now on trial


In another recent case, in Ulyanovsk, I believe, an ambulance picked up a man who was passed out, drunk. He woke up inside the moving ambulance and attacked the nurse tending to him, breaking her jaw. To be fair, that one was partially due to their own negligence, should have probably put restraints on the dude. But, still.

Anyhow, you combine that with poor pay... You get what you get...

But, yeah, Mr. Putin, better spend some more money on Syria instead...
 
Likes: 2 people
May 2006
9,635
4,023
#4
Kinda. There are posh private clinics for the rich and powerful; and the shitty public hospitals for everyone else. It's a two-tier system, really...
Isn't it funny how if you travel in either direction, left or right, far enough, you end up in the same place?

Wait...does this mean that perhaps the world is not flat??
 
Likes: 2 people
Sep 2016
19,466
13,506
My own world
#6
Yes, what do you expect in a government so corrupt they make banana republics look good? . What I don't get is why soo many Russians kiss the ground Putin walks on. One thing Russia has taught the world is how NOT to go from communism to capitalism without strict controls on how to control public assets.

The failing Soviet state left the ownership of state assets contested, which allowed for informal deals with former USSR officials (mostly in Russia and Ukraine) as a means to acquire state property. Harvard medieval historian Edward L. Keenan has drawn a comparison between the current Russian system of oligarchs and the system of powerful Boyars which emerged in late-Medieval Muscovy.

The Russian oligarchs are business entrepreneurs who emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev (General Secretary 1985-1991) during his period of market liberalization.
By the end of the Soviet era in 1991 and during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, many Russian businessmen imported or smuggled goods such as personal computers and jeans into the country and sold them, often on the black market, for a hefty profit.


Anatoly Chubais, the man most credited with the Yeltsin-era privatization that led to the growth of the oligarchs
During the 1990s, once Boris Yeltsin (President of Russia from 1991) took office, the oligarchs emerged as well-connected entrepreneurs who started from nearly nothing and became rich through participation in the market via connections to the corrupt, but elected, government of Russia during the state's transition to a market-based economy. The so-called voucher-privatization program enabled a handful of young men to become billionaires, specifically by arbitraging the vast difference between old domestic prices for Russian commodities (e.g. gas, oil) and the prices prevailing on the world market. Because they stashed billions of dollars in private Swiss bank accounts rather than investing in the Russian economy, they were dubbed[by whom?] "kleptocrats". These oligarchs became extremely unpopular with the Russian public, and are commonly thought[by whom?] of as the cause of much of the turmoil that plagued the country following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Guardian described the oligarchs as "about as popular with your average Russian as a man idly burning bundles of £50s outside an orphanage".

Post-Soviet business oligarchs include relatives or close associates of government officials, even government officials themselves, as well as criminal bosses who achieved vast wealth by acquiring state assets very cheaply (or for free) during the privatization process controlled by the Yeltsin government of 1991-1999. Specific accusations of corruption are often leveled[by whom?] at Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar, two of the "Young Reformers" chiefly responsible for Russian privatization in the early 1990s. According to David Satter, author of Darkness at Dawn, "what drove the process was not the determination to create a system based on universal values but rather the will to introduce a system of private ownership, which, in the absence of law, opened the way for the criminal pursuit of money and power".In some cases, outright criminal groups - in order to avoid attention - assign front-men to serve as executives and/or "legal" owners of the companies they control.

Although the majority of oligarchs were not formally connected with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there are allegations[by whom?] that they were promoted (at least initially) by the communist apparatchiks, with strong connections to Soviet power structures and access to the monetary funds of the Communist Party. Official Russian media usually depict oligarchs as the enemies of "communist forces". The latter is a stereotype that describes political power that wants to restore Soviet-style communism in Russia.

During Yeltsin's presidency (1991-1999) oligarchs became increasingly influential in Russian politics; they played a significant role in financing the re-election of Yeltsin in 1996. With insider information about financial decisions of the government, oligarchs could easily increase their wealth even further. The 1998 Russian financial crisis hit some of the oligarchs hard, however, and those whose holdings were still based mainly on banking lost much of their fortunes.

The most influential and exposed oligarchs from the Yeltsin era include Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Smolensky, Pyotr Aven, Vladimir Vinogradov and Vitaly Malkin.[6][7][8] They formed what became known as Semibankirschina (or seven bankers), a small group of business moguls with a great influence on Boris Yeltsin and his political environment. Together they controlled from 50% to 70% of all Russian finances between 1996 and 2000.

Potanin, Malkin and Fridman are the only ones on the list to have retained their influence in the Putin era (1999- ). Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and Gusinsky "have been purged by the Kremlin", according to The Guardian.

Oligarchs during Putin's presidency
The most famous oligarchs of the Putin era include Roman Abramovich, Alexander Abramov, Oleg Deripaska, Mikhail Fridman, Mikhail Prokhorov, Alisher Usmanov, German Khan, Viktor Vekselberg, Leonid Mikhelson, Vagit Alekperov, Pyotr Aven, and still Vladimir Potanin and Vitaly Malkin.

Between 2000 and 2004, Putin apparently engaged in a power-struggle with some oligarchs, reaching a "grand bargain" with them. This bargain allowed the oligarchs to maintain their powers, in exchange for their explicit support of – and alignment with – Putin's government.

Many more business people have become oligarchs during Putin's time in power, and often due to personal relations with Putin, such as the rector of the institute where Putin obtained a degree in 1996, Vladimir Litvinenko, and Putin's childhood judo-teacher Arkady Rotenberg. However, other analysts[which?] argue that the oligarchic structure has remained intact under Putin, with Putin devoting much of his time to mediating power-disputes between rival oligarchs.

During Putin's presidency, a number of oligarchs came under fire for various illegal activities, particularly tax evasion in the businesses they acquired. However, it is widely speculated and believed[by whom?] that the charges were also politically motivated, as these tycoons have fallen out of favour with the Kremlin. Vladimir Gusinsky (MediaMost) and Boris Berezovsky both avoided legal proceedings by leaving Russia, and the most prominent, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (of Yukos oil), was arrested in October 2003 and sentenced to 9 years, which was subsequently extended to 14 years. (Putin, however, pardoned him, and he was released on 20 December 2013.

The term 'oligarch' has also been applied[by whom?] to technology investors such as Yuri Milner, although without involvement in Russian politics.

Defenders of the out-of-favor oligarchs (often associated with Chubais's party—the Union of Right Forces) argue that the companies they acquired were not highly valued at the time because they still ran on Soviet principles, with non-existent stock-control, huge payrolls, no financial reporting and scant regard for profit. They turned the businesses—often vast—around and made them deliver value for shareholders. They obtain little sympathy from the Russian public, though, due to resentment over the economic disparity they represent.

In 2004, Forbes listed 36 billionaires of Russian citizenship, with an interesting note: "this list includes businessmen of Russian citizenship who acquired the major share of their wealth privately, while not holding a governmental position". In 2005, the number of billionaires dropped to 30, mostly because of the Yukos case, with Khodorkovsky dropping from #1 (US$15.2 billion) to #21 (US$2.0 billion).

Billionaire, philanthropist, art patron and former KGB agent Alexander Lebedev has criticized the oligarchs, saying "I think material wealth for them is a highly emotional and spiritual thing. They spend a lot of money on their own personal consumption." Lebedev has also described them as a bunch of uncultured ignoramuses, saying "They don't read books. They don't have time. They don't go to [art] exhibitions. They think the only way to impress anyone is to buy a yacht." He also notes that the oligarchs have no interest in social injustice.

Oligarchs in London
A significant number of Russian oligarchs have bought homes in upscale sections of London in the United Kingdom,
which has been dubbed[by whom?] "Moscow on Thames".[17] Some, like Len Blavatnik, Eugene Shvidler, Alexander Knaster, Konstantin Kagalovsky and Abram Reznikov, are expatriates, having taken permanent residency in London. This community has led to journalists calling the city "Londongrad". Most own homes in both countries as well as property and have acquired controlling interests in major European companies. They commute on a regular basis between the EU and Russia; in many cases their families reside in London, with their children attending school there. In 2007 Abram Reznikov bought one of Spain's mega recycling companies, Alamak Espana Trade SL, while Roman Abramovich bought the English football club, Chelsea F.C., in 2003, and has spent record amounts on players' salaries.

In 2013 expatriate oligarch Leonard Blavatnik's refurbished home was possibly the most expensive house in London (per sq ft.)

The billionaire Moscow oligarch Mikhail Fridman (Russia's second richest man as of 2016) is currently restoring Athlone House in London, to be one of his primary residences. The house will be worth £130 million when restored.

2008 global recession and credit crisis
According to the financial news-agency Bloomberg L.P., Russia's wealthiest 25 individuals have collectively lost US$230 billion (£146 billion) since July 2008. The fall in the oligarchs' wealth relates closely to the meltdown in Russia's stock market, as the RTS Index has lost 71% of its value due to the capital flight after the Russia/Georgia conflict of August 2008.

Billionaires in Russia and Ukraine have been particularly hard-hit by lenders seeking repayment on balloon loans in order to shore up their own balance sheets. Many oligarchs took out generous loans from Russian banks, bought shares, and then took out more loans from western banks against the value of these shares. One of the first to get hit by the global downturn was Oleg Deripaska, Russia's richest man at the time, who had a net worth of US$28 billion in March 2008. As Deripaska borrowed money from western banks using shares in his companies as collateral, the collapse in share price forced him to sell holdings to satisfy the margin calls.

The Russian oligarch as an archetype
The wealth, political power, and (to some) negative attributes of Donald Trump as a candidate for the presidency of the United States in 2016 drew comparisons with Russian oligarchs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_oligarch
 
Last edited:
Likes: 2 people
May 2006
9,635
4,023
#7
But they have universal health care!
You point out an interesting point and something any Liberal thinker must bear in mind. Communism could be great. Socialism could be great. A monarchy can be great. Socialized medicine can be great. Totally privatized medicine can be great.

Just about any system can be terrific if the citizens are educated, willing, active participants. The goal of our institutions often appears to me to be the opposite, to have citizens be confused, uncertain, and passive. As the ranting Nick Nolte character said, it's not what you do goddammit, it's how you do it.

America behaves like a nation of people that watches the Kardashians. Nothing can protect us from ourselves.
 
Likes: 3 people

The Man

Former Staff
Jul 2011
46,487
33,761
Toronto
#9
Yes, what do you expect in a government so corrupt they make banana republics look good? . What I don't get is why soo many Russians kiss the ground Putin walks on. One thing Russia has taught the world is how NOT to go from communism to capitalism without strict controls on how to control public assets.

The failing Soviet state left the ownership of state assets contested, which allowed for informal deals with former USSR officials (mostly in Russia and Ukraine) as a means to acquire state property. Harvard medieval historian Edward L. Keenan has drawn a comparison between the current Russian system of oligarchs and the system of powerful Boyars which emerged in late-Medieval Muscovy.

The Russian oligarchs are business entrepreneurs who emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev (General Secretary 1985-1991) during his period of market liberalization.
By the end of the Soviet era in 1991 and during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, many Russian businessmen imported or smuggled goods such as personal computers and jeans into the country and sold them, often on the black market, for a hefty profit.


Anatoly Chubais, the man most credited with the Yeltsin-era privatization that led to the growth of the oligarchs
During the 1990s, once Boris Yeltsin (President of Russia from 1991) took office, the oligarchs emerged as well-connected entrepreneurs who started from nearly nothing and became rich through participation in the market via connections to the corrupt, but elected, government of Russia during the state's transition to a market-based economy. The so-called voucher-privatization program enabled a handful of young men to become billionaires, specifically by arbitraging the vast difference between old domestic prices for Russian commodities (e.g. gas, oil) and the prices prevailing on the world market. Because they stashed billions of dollars in private Swiss bank accounts rather than investing in the Russian economy, they were dubbed[by whom?] "kleptocrats". These oligarchs became extremely unpopular with the Russian public, and are commonly thought[by whom?] of as the cause of much of the turmoil that plagued the country following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Guardian described the oligarchs as "about as popular with your average Russian as a man idly burning bundles of £50s outside an orphanage".

Post-Soviet business oligarchs include relatives or close associates of government officials, even government officials themselves, as well as criminal bosses who achieved vast wealth by acquiring state assets very cheaply (or for free) during the privatization process controlled by the Yeltsin government of 1991-1999. Specific accusations of corruption are often leveled[by whom?] at Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar, two of the "Young Reformers" chiefly responsible for Russian privatization in the early 1990s. According to David Satter, author of Darkness at Dawn, "what drove the process was not the determination to create a system based on universal values but rather the will to introduce a system of private ownership, which, in the absence of law, opened the way for the criminal pursuit of money and power".In some cases, outright criminal groups - in order to avoid attention - assign front-men to serve as executives and/or "legal" owners of the companies they control.

Although the majority of oligarchs were not formally connected with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there are allegations[by whom?] that they were promoted (at least initially) by the communist apparatchiks, with strong connections to Soviet power structures and access to the monetary funds of the Communist Party. Official Russian media usually depict oligarchs as the enemies of "communist forces". The latter is a stereotype that describes political power that wants to restore Soviet-style communism in Russia.

During Yeltsin's presidency (1991-1999) oligarchs became increasingly influential in Russian politics; they played a significant role in financing the re-election of Yeltsin in 1996. With insider information about financial decisions of the government, oligarchs could easily increase their wealth even further. The 1998 Russian financial crisis hit some of the oligarchs hard, however, and those whose holdings were still based mainly on banking lost much of their fortunes.

The most influential and exposed oligarchs from the Yeltsin era include Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Smolensky, Pyotr Aven, Vladimir Vinogradov and Vitaly Malkin.[6][7][8] They formed what became known as Semibankirschina (or seven bankers), a small group of business moguls with a great influence on Boris Yeltsin and his political environment. Together they controlled from 50% to 70% of all Russian finances between 1996 and 2000.

Potanin, Malkin and Fridman are the only ones on the list to have retained their influence in the Putin era (1999- ). Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and Gusinsky "have been purged by the Kremlin", according to The Guardian.

Oligarchs during Putin's presidency
The most famous oligarchs of the Putin era include Roman Abramovich, Alexander Abramov, Oleg Deripaska, Mikhail Fridman, Mikhail Prokhorov, Alisher Usmanov, German Khan, Viktor Vekselberg, Leonid Mikhelson, Vagit Alekperov, Pyotr Aven, and still Vladimir Potanin and Vitaly Malkin.

Between 2000 and 2004, Putin apparently engaged in a power-struggle with some oligarchs, reaching a "grand bargain" with them. This bargain allowed the oligarchs to maintain their powers, in exchange for their explicit support of – and alignment with – Putin's government.

Many more business people have become oligarchs during Putin's time in power, and often due to personal relations with Putin, such as the rector of the institute where Putin obtained a degree in 1996, Vladimir Litvinenko, and Putin's childhood judo-teacher Arkady Rotenberg. However, other analysts[which?] argue that the oligarchic structure has remained intact under Putin, with Putin devoting much of his time to mediating power-disputes between rival oligarchs.

During Putin's presidency, a number of oligarchs came under fire for various illegal activities, particularly tax evasion in the businesses they acquired. However, it is widely speculated and believed[by whom?] that the charges were also politically motivated, as these tycoons have fallen out of favour with the Kremlin. Vladimir Gusinsky (MediaMost) and Boris Berezovsky both avoided legal proceedings by leaving Russia, and the most prominent, Mikhail Khodorkovsky (of Yukos oil), was arrested in October 2003 and sentenced to 9 years, which was subsequently extended to 14 years. (Putin, however, pardoned him, and he was released on 20 December 2013.

The term 'oligarch' has also been applied[by whom?] to technology investors such as Yuri Milner, although without involvement in Russian politics.

Defenders of the out-of-favor oligarchs (often associated with Chubais's party—the Union of Right Forces) argue that the companies they acquired were not highly valued at the time because they still ran on Soviet principles, with non-existent stock-control, huge payrolls, no financial reporting and scant regard for profit. They turned the businesses—often vast—around and made them deliver value for shareholders. They obtain little sympathy from the Russian public, though, due to resentment over the economic disparity they represent.

In 2004, Forbes listed 36 billionaires of Russian citizenship, with an interesting note: "this list includes businessmen of Russian citizenship who acquired the major share of their wealth privately, while not holding a governmental position". In 2005, the number of billionaires dropped to 30, mostly because of the Yukos case, with Khodorkovsky dropping from #1 (US$15.2 billion) to #21 (US$2.0 billion).

Billionaire, philanthropist, art patron and former KGB agent Alexander Lebedev has criticized the oligarchs, saying "I think material wealth for them is a highly emotional and spiritual thing. They spend a lot of money on their own personal consumption." Lebedev has also described them as a bunch of uncultured ignoramuses, saying "They don't read books. They don't have time. They don't go to [art] exhibitions. They think the only way to impress anyone is to buy a yacht." He also notes that the oligarchs have no interest in social injustice.

Oligarchs in London
A significant number of Russian oligarchs have bought homes in upscale sections of London in the United Kingdom,
which has been dubbed[by whom?] "Moscow on Thames".[17] Some, like Len Blavatnik, Eugene Shvidler, Alexander Knaster, Konstantin Kagalovsky and Abram Reznikov, are expatriates, having taken permanent residency in London. This community has led to journalists calling the city "Londongrad". Most own homes in both countries as well as property and have acquired controlling interests in major European companies. They commute on a regular basis between the EU and Russia; in many cases their families reside in London, with their children attending school there. In 2007 Abram Reznikov bought one of Spain's mega recycling companies, Alamak Espana Trade SL, while Roman Abramovich bought the English football club, Chelsea F.C., in 2003, and has spent record amounts on players' salaries.

In 2013 expatriate oligarch Leonard Blavatnik's refurbished home was possibly the most expensive house in London (per sq ft.)

The billionaire Moscow oligarch Mikhail Fridman (Russia's second richest man as of 2016) is currently restoring Athlone House in London, to be one of his primary residences. The house will be worth £130 million when restored.

2008 global recession and credit crisis
According to the financial news-agency Bloomberg L.P., Russia's wealthiest 25 individuals have collectively lost US$230 billion (£146 billion) since July 2008. The fall in the oligarchs' wealth relates closely to the meltdown in Russia's stock market, as the RTS Index has lost 71% of its value due to the capital flight after the Russia/Georgia conflict of August 2008.

Billionaires in Russia and Ukraine have been particularly hard-hit by lenders seeking repayment on balloon loans in order to shore up their own balance sheets. Many oligarchs took out generous loans from Russian banks, bought shares, and then took out more loans from western banks against the value of these shares. One of the first to get hit by the global downturn was Oleg Deripaska, Russia's richest man at the time, who had a net worth of US$28 billion in March 2008. As Deripaska borrowed money from western banks using shares in his companies as collateral, the collapse in share price forced him to sell holdings to satisfy the margin calls.

The Russian oligarch as an archetype
The wealth, political power, and (to some) negative attributes of Donald Trump as a candidate for the presidency of the United States in 2016 drew comparisons with Russian oligarchs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_oligarch
Chubais is a piece of shit. Corrupt in the 90s, and even more so later, under Putin.

And, btw, connected closely to all those guys, Chubais, Gaidar, etc, was the young Boris Nemtsov






He was very close with Boris Berezovsky

Berezovsky was a very powerful figure in the 90s, the leader of the new oligarchs, de facto shadow President of Russia. He was later destroyed by Putin, lost much of his business empire, fled to exile in Britain, and eventually died a mysterious death, reportedly was strangled to death at his estate in London, probably on Putin's orders...

But, point is, even the current Russian oppositioners, like Nemtsov, not that I want to talk ill of the dead; or, let alone former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (nicknamed "Misha 2%" while in office, because that was his price, in bribes, for approving any allocation of state funding or something to regions or companies, a kickback of 2% of the value of the allocation), none of them are clean. So, many people don't want to listen to them, because they are no better...

Except some young new guys, like Navalny. But they don't have the resources to do much... :(

Thus, nothing can change.
 

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